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This paper is concemed with the assumption, that for understanding the motivational consequences of attributions in 
achievement contexts both aspects, the specific content of self-attributions as well as the location in the causal space 
must be considered. Based on attributions of 87 pupils some empirical arguments favouring this assumption will 
become evident: So the presented data will demonstrate, that a priori assignments of specific causes to a certain 
dimensional characteristic are not possible. Further it will be shown that decisive motivational variables (like 
academic self-concept, expectancy of success and helplessness) can show different correlations with specific 
attributions with equal perceptions of the underlying attributional dimensions. At the same time causes with different 
positions in the causal space can display the same correlations with these motivational variables. And finally it will be 
shown, that dimensional perceptions explain portions of variance of these motivational variables that go beyond that 
of the specific attributions and vice versa. Based on these arguments implications for attributional retrainings and for 
the measurement of attributions are discussed.
Attributional processes are ascribed a central role within the framework of motivational research with respect to 
scholastic achievement, a point which has been proven by an extremely wide ränge of research (for an overview see 
Pintrich & Schunk, 2002). Although remarkable success in numerous practical applications of attributional theory has 
been demonstrated, it is by no means assured that the full potential has tapped. In fact, practical utilizations of 
attributional theory often ignore an important facet, which has been insufficiently investigated up to now, even 
theoretically: Do the specific reasons (e.g., effort or ability), the perceptions o f  the underlying dimensions (e.g., 
stability, controllability) or rather a combination of both embody the decisive factors for causal explanations?
Only Dimensions?
Attributional research and practical applications are based primarily on the models developed by Weiner (1979,
1985). He assumed, that the causal explanations drawn on by students are mediated through subjective assumptions on 
(a) how temporally stable the particular attributions are (stability), (b) on the degree to which these causal factors can be 
localized within the actor (locus o f  causality) and (c) on the extent to which they can be intentionally influenced by the 
acting person (controllability). Here, the positions of causal explanations in the causal space defined by these basic 
dimensions exhibit a predominant role. Specifically speaking, Weiner argues that consequences of attributional 
processes can be ascribed to these positions in the causal space, but not to the specific content of the causal 
explanations. The model therefore classifies the different cognitive, motivational and emotional consequences of 
attributional processes according to their genotype and not their phenotype (Weiner, 1986), in other words to 
dimensional differences and not to the specific content of causal explanations. On the basis of this assumption, similar 
consequences of phenotypically different attributions can be explained through their genotypic similarity, that is, they 
are likewise perceived on the three dimensions stability, locus of causality and controllability. This view implies, that, 
in principle, dimensionalizations can be considered detached from the specific causes they refer to and that the 
relationships between attributions and that consequences of attributional processes could be predicted entirely through 
the perceptions of the underlying dimensions.
The fact that the attributional dimensions which lie at the base of causal attributions play a prominent role in the 
explanation of the resulting motivational and emotional processes has been verified in numerous empirical studies and 
investigations and has been freed from the burden of doubt for quite some time (see Graham, 1991). However, concrete 
proof that the content o f specific causal explanations has no claim on the consequences of attributional processes which 
transcends that of attributional dimensions is still lacking.
Dimensions and Causes?
Although it is undisputed that the three dimensions named above are decisive for the effects of attributions, it is also 
possible that specific reasons can possess information which is not represented in their dimensional characteristics, i.e. 
that individuals perceive additional semantic content in the specific causal factors. This should be observable in causal 
factors with identical dimensionalizations but different meanings. These factors should have different relationships with 
motivational and emotional variables influencing academic performance. Initial empirical evidence on the question as to 
whether specific causal explanations contain informational content which can not be found in attributional dimensions 
is offered by Van Overwalle (1989). He placed both, specific causal explanations and therefrom detached generalized 
dimensionalizations in relationship with the performances of university freshmen. Here it could be shown that 
dimensionalizations, although found to contribute to variance explanations in examination assessments in a manner 
which conforms with theoretical predictions, are less related to performance than specific attributions. These findings 
indicate that individuals can perceive a semantic content in causal factors which exceed the impact of stability, locus of
causality and controllability. This study, however, measured attributional dimensions at a general level, independent of 
the specific causes to which they are related. For this reason the association between specific reasons and the 
dimensions upon which they are based remains unclear, in particular the possible dependence of the effects of 
dimensional beliefs on the causal factors to which they refer.
Aims and Overview o f  the Current Research
The objective of this work is a contribution to the empirical clarification of one central research question: In order to 
completely understand the motivational consequences of attributions, does one need to consider the dimensions of these 
attributions as well as the specific reasons? We expected, that specific reasons should play a semantic role beyond that 
represented through the dimensions, and therefore the consideration of both reasons and dimensions is necessary to 
fully understand the motivational consequences of attributional processes.
In order to clarify this research question we investigated the causes grade school students referred to in explaining 
scholastic success and failure in the subject of mathematics as well as the individual perception of the dimensionality of 
these attributions. Our hypothesis, that the consideration of both reasons and dimensions is necessary, was tested by 
means of correlation and regression analyses with a combined factor which acts as an extemal criterion and covered 
three important aspects of scholastic motivational sets, namely success expectation, academic self-concept and 
experiences of helplessness. If in fact specific reasons should play a semantic role beyond dimensional properties, then 
three effects should be evident: (a) Different specific reasons which have been similarly located in the causal space 
could correlate differently with the extemal criterion. (b) Specific reasons, that correlate identically with the extemal 
criterion, could be perceived as being different with respect to how stable, internal, or controllable they are. (c) In 
regressing the extemal criteria on the dimensions, the specific causes may be shown to be responsible for explaining an 
additional proportion of the variance.
Method
Participants
A total of 87 6 * grade students participated in the questionnaire study conducted in the subject of mathematics. The 
children were attending five different classes of a “Gymnasium” (college preparatory school) in Munich, Germany. The 
average age of the participants was 12.2 years (SD = 0.6); the proportion of female participants came to 38%.
Measuring Instruments
Attribution Magnitude and Subjective Dimensionalizations
The questionnaire developed by Dresel, Schober & Ziegler (2004a) was used to assess the strength of individual 
attributions (attribution magnitude) as well as the subjective stability, intemality (i.e. locus of causality) and 
controllability of these causes (attributional dimensions). In the section of the questionnaire which assesses attribution 
magnitude, the students were presented with the seven causal classes “Ability”, “Effort”, “Concentration”, “Emotional 
factors”, “Other persons”, “Task characteristics” and “Chance” in three success scenarios and three failure scenarios. 
Each causal dass was anchored with examples of concrete attributions. For example an item from the causal dass 
“Other persons” in the case of success read, “When you accomplish a goal in math, then it is because of other persons. 
(Examples: your teacher explained the material very well, another Student let you copy his work or your parents helped 
you)”. The items were presented in conjunction with a six-point rating scale anchored by the poles 1 (I  do not agree at 
all) and 6  (I  agree completely). The resulting scale for the assessment of the magnitudes of relevant attributions in the 
context of the subject of mathematics encompasses a total of 42 items (2 situational outcomes x 3 scenarios x 7 causal 
classes). The item and scale analyses resulted in good internal consistencies (a  = .77-.8 8 ; Md(a)=.81). The subjective 
dimensionalization of the attributions was assessed subsequent to the assessment of the above named scales with a 
series of 42 single items. The students were presented with three items to measure the subjective stability, intemality 
and controllability of the causal factors in both the case of success and the case of failure for each of the seven 
attributional classes (Example: Item root “Imagine that you have just done really well on a math test. Furthermore, 
imagine that the reason you did so well is due to other persons.” Stability: “Would this reason also be important when 
you take your next math test?” Intemality: “Is this reason true because of you or because of something eise?” 
Controllability: “Can you influence this reason at will?”). The items were to be answered according to a six point 
answer scale with the poles 1 (absolutely not /is due to something else/I cannot influence if) and 6  (absolutely/is due to 
me/1 can influence it).
Expectancy o f  Success
A Five Item Scale developed by Dresel et al. (2004a) came into Operation to assess the expectations the students had 
of how successfully they will come to terms with future challenges in the subject of mathematics (Sample item: “In the 
future, I will certainly perform well in math”). The items were assessed along a six-point rating scale from 1 (absolutely 
disagree) to 6  (agree completely). The analysis of the internal consistency resulted in a  = .71.
Academic Self-concept
In order to assess the academic self-concept in the subject of mathematics, a domain specific Version of three item 
pairs from the scale “Belief in one’s own abilities” (Dweck, 1999) came into operation (Sample item pair: “I see myself 
as being generally talented at math” vs. “I doubt whether I am talented at math”). Each of the statements in an item pair 
represented a pole along a six-point answer scale, whereby a low value represented a low academic self-concept in the 
subject of mathematics. The internal consistency of the scale was a  = .78.
Helplessness
Domain specific helplessness was assessed with three items from the Helplessness Scale (HiS; Breitkopf, 1985), 
adapted for the subject of mathematics (Sample item: “Even if  I study a lot, I won’t be good at math”). The items were 
answered on the basis of a six-point answer scale with the poles 1 (absolutely disagree) and 6  (agree completely). The 
scale demonstrated an internal consistency of a  = .69.
In order to address the theoretical questions being pursued in the present work, the scale means of success 
expectation, academic self-concept and helplessness were combined. This was justified by high correlations between 
the three scales measuring aspects of students motivation (|rs| > .58) and a single factorial solution resulting from a 
factor analysis including the three scale values. The consistency of the resulting indicator was a  = .82. The higher the 
value of this composite is, the more advantageous the motivational set is.
Results
Descriptive Statistics and Mean Differences
Table 1 contains mean values and Standard deviations calculated for the magnitudes and the dimensions of the 
attributions for success and failure. The first point one can make in reference to attribution magnitude is that success, on 
the average, was mainly explained by effort and concentration. In the case of failure, moreover, emotional factors such 
as nervousness, and task characteristics such as degree of difficulty, are made responsible for poor performances to a 
comparable extent. Both possible situational outcomes were attributed to a lesser extent to own abilities (or lack of it).
In considering the subjective dimensionalization of the attributions, one is initially struck by the comparatively high 
levels of the variances obtained. The variances of the subjective dimensionalizations were compared with those of the 
attributional magnitudes. For 27 of 42 dimension variables, a test of the homogeneity of variances for two correlated 
samples (Pitman, 1939) confirmed at the 5% level that their variance was greater than that of the corresponding 
attributional magnitude. These noticeably greater distributions indicate that the subjective search for the position within 
the causal space of different explanations for success and failure is comprised of large inter-individual differences.
When the subjective stability, intemality and controllability of the various causal categories are compared with one 
another, one can isolate a series of significant findings (see Table 1). In the case of success, effort and concentration are 
perceived, on the average, as being more stable, more internal and more controllable than one’s own abilities, which in 
tum are judged to have the same (moderate) degree of stability as task characteristics or emotional factors. In comparing 
the two causal factors “Ability” and “Task characteristics” it is worth remarking that they are appraised, in similar 
manners, to be internal grounds for the realization of a success. When attributing a failure to lack of abilities, the 
students associate this cause with higher degrees of variability and extemality than they do when the same Situation is 
perceived to be due to “Chance”. In contrast, effort, concentration, emotional factors and task characteristics are 
understood as being more stable and more internal. Even the attribution “Other persons” was perceived as being more 
intemally localized than “own” abilities. The controllability of the causes of failure unfolds a somewhat more 
differentiated image: Here effort, concentration and emotional factors are assessed as being more controllable than 
ability, task characteristics and other persons. Chance, in tum, is seen as being more uncontrollable than any of the other 
factors.
Correlations with the External Criterion
As shown in Table 2, the bivariate correlations between the attribution magnitudes and the combined value of 
expectation of success, academic self-concept and helplessness repeat, for the most part, the familiar pattems known 
from the literature (e.g., Marsh, Caims, Relich, Barnes & Debus, 1984; Platt, 1988; Skaalvik, 1994). However, the 
correlations for causal explanations of failure by “Other persons”, “Task characteristics” and “Chance” which are often 
understood as being beneficial for self-esteem (e.g., Weiner, 1985) showed an unexpected direction and were associated 
with unfavorable expressions of the criterion variable. Also, the analysis of the relationships between the subjective 
dimensionalizations of the causal factors and the dependent variable yielded a number of significant correlations 
(Table 2). Here one is struck by the relatively high levels of correlations for the dimensional perceptions of “Ability”, 
“Effort” and “Concentration” as attributions of success in comparison to the low correlations for the other variables.
To answer the question of a possible motivationally relevant semantic fraction of causal attributions, not included in 
the dimensional perception, the relationships of attributions with identical dimensionalizations were examined. If  no 
additional semantic fraction is inherent, reasons with the same dimensionalizations should exhibit identical correlations 
with the external criterion. When one considers correlations with the dependent variable of the two attributions to
success “Ability” and “Task characteristics”, which are both perceived in the same degree as stable, internal and 
controllable (comp. Table 1), it becomes clear that these two causal factors display different relationships to the 
criterion variable. By applying Steiger’s (1980) test for independent correlation coefficients, the difference in 
correlation coefficients could be statistically confirmed (z = 6.17; p  < .001). When an analogous investigation is made 
for the two attributions of failure “Concentration” and “Emotional factors”, which can not be differentiated with respect 
to the degree of stability, intemality and controllability accredited to them (cf. Table 1), one ascertains that for these two 
attributions, correlations with the criteria variables yield contrary pattems (z = 4.02; p  < .001). Both of the correlational 
differences reported were still detected after the application of attenuation-corrected correlation coefficients (zs > 5.26; 
ps < .0 0 1 ).
Evidence for additional gains of information would also be supplied when attributions with identical relationships to 
an extemal criterion were found to have different dimensionalizations. The attributions “Other persons”, “Task 
characteristics” and “Chance” in the case of success feature a comparable correlation with the motivational set (no 
significant differences among the three correlation coefficients; zs < .54; ps > .59), they were, however, subject to 
different appraisals with respect to the dimensions accredited to them (cf. Table 1). Similar results were obtained for the 
two attributions to failure “Ability” and “Task characteristics” (z -  .85; p  -  .39). Additionally, after the application of 
attenuation-corrected correlation coefficients, significant differences could still be isolated for the trio of success 
attributions (zs < .77; ps > .44) as well as for the duo of failure attributions (z = 1.37; p  = .17).
Proportions o f  Criterion Variance
Finally, estimations of unique proportions of the variance of the criterion variable accounted for the magnitudes of 
the specific attributions on the one hand and for their dimensionalizations on the other were obtained (Cohen & Cohen, 
1983, pp. 139-154). First the full model was specified for each of the 14 factors of success and failure, in that the 
attribution magnitu.de of a causal factor as well as the three perceptions of stability, intemality and controllability of this 
causal factor were included as predictors. On the basis of the full models, a second step determined to what degree the 
exclusion of the attribution magnitude reduced the explained criterion variance. The common _F-Test was used to 
determine whether the resulting difference AR2M (semipartial R1 in terms of Cohen & Cohen, 1983), which represents 
the part of the criterion variance that uniquely accounted for the attribution magnitude, is significantly greater than zero. 
An analog process was conducted in a third step with the set of the three dimensionalizations: The part of the variance 
of the motivational set that uniquely accounted for the subjective dimensionalizations of a causal factor (Aä2Sic) was 
determined by removing the three variables. The variance proportions AR2M and AR2SIC are most central with respect to 
our research questions, and are therefore presented in Table 3 alongside the regression coefficients contained in the full 
model.
The results indicate differentiated proportions according to different causal factors. For a first group of causal 
factors it could be shown that the variance of the motivational set could be entirely explained through 
dimensionalization, i.e. there was no significant variance proportion which could uniquely account for the attribution 
magnitudes. This group contained the success attributions “Effort”, “Concentration” and “Emotional factors” as well as 
the failure attribution “Concentration”. For a second group of causal factors (success explanations through high ability 
levels and failure explanations through unfavorable emotional factors), for the set of the perceptions of stability, 
intemality, and controllability, as well as for the magnitudes of specific causes, unique variance proportions could be 
confirmed. Alongside, for a third group of the causal factors, the analysis demonstrated that exclusively the magnitude 
of the specific cause shared unique variance with the extemal criterion. The dimensional perception of these causes 
made no contribution to the explanation of the variance that is not represented in the attribution magnitudes. This third 
group of causes primarily contained, in addition to ability attributions in cases of failure, those causal factors deemed by 
Weiner (1985) to be extemal (“Other persons”, “Task characteristics”, “Chance” in the case of success). For the two 
attributions to failure “Effort” and “Chance” no statistically significant relationships could be secured for either 
attributional magnitude or dimensionalization.
Discussion
At first, the present study provided a large degree of support for the waming made by Rüssel (1982), not to make the 
“fundamental attributional error” of disregarding inter-individual differences and therefore subjective views of the 
dimensionalization of attributions. Specifically spoken, we observed a large degree of inter-individual variance 
underlying the subjective dimensionalizations and perceptions of the dimensional characteristics of causes which could 
not be integrated into the classifications originally postulated by Weiner (1979,1985).
Our main research question dealt with the populär view that psychological relevance follows from the position 
attributions occupy in the causal space spanned by the attributional dimensions (e.g., Weiner, 1985). In the examination 
of their relationships with a combined value of three motivational variables (expectancy of success, academic self- 
concept, helplessness), it could be shown that the dimensionalizations of all causal factors do not have the same type of 
relationship with this extemal criterion. These differences indicate the possibility that dimensional perceptions of 
attributions can have psychological consequences dependent on the particular specific causes to which they refer. 
However, maybe the most striking results of the present study are that attributions which are identically located in the
causal space can demonstrate different, and to some degree contrary, relationships with the extemal criterion and that 
attributions which demonstrate different relationships with the criterion can have the same dimensional constellations. 
Thus, the assumption that phenotypically different specific reasons, which have identical geneotypical locations in 
causal space, do not differ (Weiner, 1986), is not consistent with the results of our investigation. Furthermore, the 
regression analyses showed that for each causal factor, dimensional perceptions and magnitudes of the factor made 
differential unique contributions to the explanation of the variance of the motivational criterion. It could only be shown 
for one third of the causal factors that the clarification of the criterion variance stemmed exclusively from their 
dimensional positioning. For the remaining attributions, including the explanation through own abilities, it was found 
that the intensity of the specific attributions either had additional explanatory capacity or stood in an exclusive 
relationship with the criterion. These results imply that dimensional perceptions and magnitudes exercise differential 
levels of relevance according to the particular causal explanations.
One rather obvious theoretical objection could be raised against our conclusion that dimensions and specific reasons 
need to be considered in tandem, namely, that not all relevant dimensions could be assessed, by what additional 
proportions of variance explanation could have been possible. A good candidate here would be globality. Admittedly, it 
was shown, that in achievement contexts globality is of weak significance (Peterson, Maier & Seligman, 1993; Weiner,
1986). Furthermore, Weiner (1986) himself has collected a great deal of evidence that the three dimensions stability, 
locus of causality and controllability are sufficient to describe the consequences of attributional processes in 
achievement contexts. Nevertheless, one must admit that the incorporation of additional dimensions will still be unable 
to explain the finding that specific reasons, which have the same relationships with motivation variables, can be 
perceived as different stable, internal, or controllable.
With respect to our method, the criticism could arise that the correlational findings result from measures which are 
unreliable (to a varying manner). Beyond the fact that, in particular, measurements of attribution magnitudes are of a 
good reliability by known means, this can be largely dismissed due to the fact that the differences between the 
conceming correlations remain significant resp. insignificant after attenuation correction. Although the impact of the 
differential criterion relationships of identically dimensionalized reasons and the divergent dimensionalization of 
reasons with equivalent relationships to a criterion can hardly be placed under methodological question, artifacts in the 
form of differentiated variances and varying levels of magnitude for specific causes can not be completely ruled out for 
the regression analyses. So, the results of the regression analyses point out the need for a replication, especially in a 
longitudinal design. Thereby the changes in the variables of the motivational set should be observed with respect to 
their dependence on attributional processes. Here one would be able to specify which motivational consequences the 
magnitude of specific causal explanations can have at the one hand and, simultaneously could be tested, which have 
their dimensional perceptions at the other hand (Dresel, Schober & Ziegler, 2004b).
Our findings have significance for both the conception of measuring instruments intending to assess attributions as 
well as the development of trainings designed to improve attributional style. The measurement of attributions should 
assess both specific reasons as well as the dimensions of these reasons in the fiiture, since these variables are 
responsible for the clarification of independent proportions of variance. A reduction to specific reasons or their position 
in the causal space alone can lead to the loss of valuable information. So far attributional retrainings have almost 
exclusively operated with specific reasons. For example, a failure was met with a comment that indicated to the Student 
that the outcome can be attributed to the high difficulty of the task (Heller & Ziegler, 1996). There was no control 
exercised to insure that the training participant perceived this attribution as extemal and variable, i.e. in the desired self- 
worth protecting manner. The type of understanding desired must be secured before one can begin to operate with 
specific attributions.
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics o f  all Attributional Variables Assessed.
Attribution M  (SD)
ABIL EFFO CONC EMOT OTHE TASK CHAN
Success
Magnitide 4.5 ( l . l ) 1 5.2 (0.9) n 5.1 (0.9) 11 4.6 ( l . l ) 1 3.8 (1.4)m 4.5 (1.2) 1 2.6 (1.3)™
Stability 4.3 (1.4) 1 5.1 (1.2) 11 5.3 (1.0) 11 4.6 (1.4) 1 3.2 (1.5)m 4.4 (1.4) 1 2.2 (1.3)rv
Intemality 4.2 (1.5) 1 5.1 (1.2) 11 5.2 (1.0) 11 5.0 (1.2)n 3.3 (1.7)m 4.0 (1.7) 1 2.3 (1.6)IV
Controllability 3.9 (1.7) 1 5.1 ( l . l ) 11 5.1 (1.2) 11 4.8 (1.5)n 3.1 (1.7)m 3.6 (1.7) 1 2.1 (1.5)rv
Failure
Magnitude 2.7 (1.2) 1 4.0 (1.5) 11 4.4 (1.2) 11 4.4 (1.3)n 3.0 (1.3) 1 4.3 (1.2)n 2.8 (1.3) 1
Stability 2.7 (1.5) 1 4.2 (1.8) 11 4.4 (1.6) 11 4.4 (1.6 ) n 2.9 (1.6 ) 1 4.1 (1.5)n 2.5 (1.7) 1
Intemality 2.9 (1.7) 1 4.6 (1.6) 11 4.5 (1.6) 11 4.8 (1.3)n 3.5 (1.7)m 4.2 (1.6 ) n 2.7 (1.7) 1
Controllability 3.5 (1.8) 1 5.1 (1.4) 11 4.9 (1.3)n 4.7 (1.5)n 3.2 (1.8) 1 3.4 (1.9) 1 2.0 (1.4)m
Note. N — 87 for all values and analyses. ABIL = Ability; EFFO = Effort; CONC = Concentration; EMOT = Emotional 
Factors; OTHE = Other Persons; TASK = Task Characteristics; CHAN -  Chance. High values correspond to a higher 
occurrence of the respective construct. For both, success and failure, means were row wise compared by applying 
MANOVAs with repeated measurements. Significant differences could be confirmed for all eight groups (Fs. (6,516) >
26.429; ps  < .001). The values were compared to one another with post-hoc tests (Bonferroni adjusted). Roman 
numerals indicate those groups of values which cannot be distmguished ftom one another on at least the 1 0 % level.
Table 2. Pearson Correlations Between the Attributional Variables and the Composite o f  the Dependent Variables 
Expectation o f  Success, Academic Self-Concept and Helplessness.
Attribution
ABIL EFFO CONC EMOT OTHE TASK CHAN
Success
Magnitide .55*** .24* .31** .15+ -.24* -.30** -.30**
Stability 4 4 *** .23* .23* .06 - . 1 0 -.24* -.08
Intemality 3 7 *** 41*** 42*** .29** - . 0 2 - . 0 2 -.08
Controllability 46*** .32** .26** .03 - . 0 1 - . 1 0
Failure
Magnitide - 53*** .13 29** -.19* -.31** _ 4 4 *** -.12
Stability -.13 -.01 .15+ -.18* -.07 - 25* * .04
Intemality -.23* ,16+ 3 4 *** .13 . 0 1 -.09 -.09
Controllability .13 .22* .26** .13 .06 -.14+ -,17+
Note. N =  87 for all coefficients. ABIL = Ability; EFFO = EfFort; CONC = Concentration; EMOT = Emotional Factors; 
OTHE = Other Persons; TASK = Task Characteristics; CHAN = Chance.
*** p  < .001. ** p  < .01. * p  < .05.+ p  < .10.
Table 3. Regression Analyses to Estimate the Proportions o f  the Motivational Set Variance that Accounted Uniquely fo r  
the Attribution Magnitude or Uniquely fo r  the Set o f  Three Underlying Attributional Dimensions.
Attribution
ABIL EFFO CONC EMOT OTHE TASK CHAN
Success
/i2 .37 . 2 2 .19 . 1 2 .07 . 1 0 . 1 0
AR2m ü*** . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 .05* .04+ 09**
AÄ2sic .06+ 17** .1 1 * .1 0 * . 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 1
Failure
Ä2 .31 .08 .15 .16 . 1 1 .19 .05
AÄ2m 2 0 *** . 0 1 . 0 2 .06* io** 22*** . 0 1
AÄ2sic . 0 2 .06 .07+ .1 2 * . 0 2 . 0 1 .04
Note. N =  87 for all analyses. Dependent variable in every analysis is the composite of expectation of success, academic 
self-concept and helplessness. ABIL = Ability; EFFO = EfFort; CONC = Concentration; EMOT = Emotional Factors; 
OTHE = Other Persons; TASK = Task Characteristics; CHAN = Chance. R2 -  Explained criterion variance of the full 
model; AR2M = i?2change and the significance level of the fdumgeO ,82) test attained by excluding attribution magnitude 
from the full model; AÄ2Sic = Ä2change and significance level of the ^ ^ ( 3 , 8 2 )  test attained by excluding the three 
subjective dimensionalizations from the full model.
*** p  < .001. **p  < .01. * p <  .05. +p  < .10.
